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ABSTRACT  
This article examines how the judicial selection, appointment and renewal processes deeply 
constrain and influence decision making processes at the Court of Justice. The short tenure 
period combined with the permanent triennial renewal of sitting judges are a source of 
instability at the Court of Justice and the discretion left to Member States for renewal is a 
concern for judicial independence. Besides, even if Member States were to concur on the core 
requirements of judicial merit, they may disagree on what judicial merit means in the context 
of the Court of Justice – in the same way that they have different views about European 
integration and the Court’s role in that respect. Against this institutional background, we 
argue that collegiality as a constitutive value is a safeguard of independence as much as it 
facilitates the development of a common discourse within which individual decisions will be 
made. In this context, the development of legal principles is no worse than can reasonably be 
expected; the judges display considerable independence within the constraints placed upon 
the Court. Collegiality in particular is a means towards a jurisprudence that is not too 
closely based on the legal culture or traditions of any particular Member State. But some 
judgments may appear to be compromises, and more radical reform will be needed for those 
who hanker after clearer and bolder decisions. More ambitious judicial reforms can however 
only succeed with in mind a single, non-renewable term of office, without any triennial 
renewal of the Court membership.  
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§1. INTRODUCTION 
One scholar, Ditlev Tamm, recently asked ‘to whom does the Court belong?’, swiftly 
answering that the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’, as a judicial 
body)
2
was not to be linked with a country or any other tangible unit, but to an abstract idea of 
Europe’.
3
 The Court essentially belongs, it was suggested, to the European citizens, even if 
access to the Court was only through preliminary references from domestic courts. Justice 
naturally must be administered ‘in the name of the people’. Yet any appraisal of the Court’s 
sense of belonging – another term, we believe, for discussing the Court’s legitimacy –must 
acknowledge the relevance of the Court’s institutional constraints upon its capacities. From 
that perspective, the Court’s institutional design and processes on judicial appointments paint 
a less ideal picture, where Member States traditionally retain some discretionary links with 
the Court on judicial appointments. We then seek, in this article, to demonstrate the ways in 
which the judicial selection, appointment and renewal processes deeply constrain and 
influence decision making processes, including the style of many judgements. 
 Our argument will proceed as follows. The Court has been designed as a sui generis, 
supranational court; it is neither an international court nor a domestic supreme or 
constitutional court, though it has functions similar to those. We start with a brief account of 
the institutional guarantees and mechanisms shaping the independence of the judge at the 
Court (§2). We then examine the Member States’ stronghold on selection for appointments to 
the Court (§3). Familiar to international courts, the current selection and appointment process 
fall short of subscribing to a specific vision of the ‘bon juge européen’, beyond the 
requirement that those appointed should be independent and have the qualifications for 
selection to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or be jurisprudents of 
recognised competence. The influence of Member States on issues such as a possible 
specialisation of judges or gender diversity is immense.  
The core guarantees of judicial independence are in place but they are silent on 
whether or how Member States will renew the short tenure of their individual judge or 
advocate general. While members of the Court are generally renewed in their post, this is far 
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from certain and taken altogether, the short judicial tenure, the partial replacement of judges 
every three years and the discretionary power of Member States to renew the mandate of their 
national judge are a source of major discomfort: they undermine the principle of 
independence in judicial appointments and are a source of instability in the daily workings of 
the Court (§4).  
 However, within the precinct of the Court itself, the Court strives to safeguard and 
develop impartiality, and we argue that the principle of collegiality in judicial decision 
making allows the Court’s culture of independence to grow in an organic fashion (§5). Judges 
are careful not to rely on references to their own legal culture in their decision-making 
process, and not just within the judgment. Collegiality as a constitutive value is a safeguard 
of independence as much as it facilitates the development of a common discourse within 
which individual decisions will be made. We conclude that against this background, the 
development of legal principles is no worse than can reasonably be expected; that the judges 
display considerable independence within the constraints placed upon the Court. Judicial 
reform with more ambition is needed for the Court to claim a sense of belonging to the 
European people rather than to their nations.  
 
§2. INSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Judicial legitimacy commonly refers to the acceptance of a court’s impartiality and 
competence by the parties, society at large and, in the context of the Court, domestic 
jurisdictions. This acceptance arises on the basis of various factors, such as the selection of 
judges, their independence and the reasoning supporting the Court’s judgments. As way of 
background to our analysis, we now consider the protection given to judicial independence.  
 The personal independence of the judges at the Court is guaranteed by their immunity 
from legal proceedings, by their irremovability apart from normal replacement and by having 
their right to salary and pension protected by virtue of the Consolidated Statute of the Court, 
annexed to the Treaties.
4
 Those protections are not absolute but derogations from them are 
cumbersome
5
 and likely to be only effective when a judge misconducts him or herself quite 
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blatantly in a way which is not directly connected to the merits of his or her judicial 
decisions, and this has never happened until today. Guarantees are thus in place to ensure the 
imperviousness of European Court judges to external intervention or pressure from other 
European institutions in the exercise of their judicial office.
6
 
 Whilst dismissal is practically impossible, it may be possible to sideline some judges 
(and promote others) by allocating the most sensitive cases to certain judges at the expense of 
others. Whilst the practice of assignment differs between the Court (as a judicial body) and 
the General Court, some mechanisms act as basic safeguards against some possible internal 
abuse of power, in the shape of case assignment being considered at the regular General 
Meeting of the Court (as a judicial body) and in the form of a published rota between judges 
at the General Court.
7
 As elsewhere, the distinction between an administrative action and a 
purely adjudicative action may be blurred at times, particularly regarding the increased 
managerial responsibilities upon judges relating to caseload and case assignment. For present 
purposes it suffices to note the European Parliament resolution (29 April 2015) 
recommending the reorganisation of the institution ‘in such a way as to make a clearer 
separation between legal and administrative functions.’
8
 Modest though the statement is, it 
refers to matters of judicial governance and leadership over the organisation of the judiciary, 
which will influence its susceptibility to external influence. Such matters include the drive for 
efficiency and economy common to all European institutions: the Court has had to do more 
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 Those guarantees make it ‘wholly unfounded’ to claim that the Court’s independence is undermined on that the 
ground that the Court is itself an EU institution, see Case C-199/11Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and 
others, EU:C:2012:684, para. 64; see also, on the meaning and guarantees of judicial independence,  Case C-
175/11, H.I.D. and B.A. v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, EU:C:2013:45, para 95–97. 
7
The functions of the Court’s General Meeting are discussed below, Section 3.1. In both Courts, important cases 
are sent to the Grand Chamber (15 judges) in order to promote uniformity in the interpretation ofEU law. In 
other cases, assignment is considered at the general meeting of the Court (as a judicial body) and the decision 
belongs to the President of the Court, see Article 60, Consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Court of Justice of 25 September 2012, Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012 [2012] 
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General Court retains the discretion to derogate from these rotas in order to take into account ‘a connection 
between cases or with a view to ensuring an even spread of the workload’, see [2016] OJ 2016/C 296/02 and 
2016/C 296/04 and Article 25, Consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 
September 2012. 
8
 Judicial governance holds surprisingly in one line in Article 9 (3), Consolidated version of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012: ‘the President shall ensure the proper functioning of the 
services of the Court’ – as an institution. The European Parliament’s recommendation is specifically aimed at 
the risk, for judges, of having to rule on appeals against acts in which their authorities have been directly 
involved, see T-479/14 Kendrion v. European Union, EU:T:2016:196 and EU:T:2015:2; C-50/12 P Kendrion v. 
Commission, EU:C:2013:771; T-577/14 Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne v. European Union, 
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with less, with substantial gains in productivity in spite of a continuing growth in the number 
of new cases.
9
 However, while saving resources is ‘the constant preoccupation of the Court’, 
the Court has recently stated that limits in gains of productivity have been reached, creating a 
‘immense challenge for all the support services, notably the languages services’.
10
 For the 
sake of judicial independence, then, the aggregate work of the Court requires vigilance about 
the daily interactions between administrative and judicial actions.  
 
§3. THE MEMBER STATES’ STRONGHOLD ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 
The process of selection and appointment to the Court of Justice is naturally instrumental in 
shaping the capacities and the legitimacy of the Court of Justice. The most influential 
requirement is that of having one judge per Member State, as set in Article 19 (2) TEU. The 
number of judges at the Court can be increased or decreased by Treaty revision only under 
Article 281 TFEU. By comparison, the General Court shall include ‘at least’ one judge per 
Member State under Article 19 (2) TEU, and the Statute of the Court of Justice, which 
determines the exact number of judges at the General Court, can be more easily amended 
under Articles 254 and 281 TFEU. This explains the focus, in recent years, on amending the 
number of General Court members rather than that of the Court members.  In both cases, a 
considerable political concession is made that every Member State must have a judge, and it 
has great discretion in deciding whom to nominate. Basic features of the European judge 
nonetheless gradually emerge.  
 
A. NATIONAL DISCRETION 
The equal allocation is naturally defended strongly by some Member States. In the early 
2000s there was a proposal by Council to provide additional judges for the Court of First 
Instance (as it was then). It was abandoned a few years later, essentially due to the inability of 
Member States to agree upon a rotation mechanism to allocate the additional judicial posts 
between Member States. Then the Court of Justice in 2011 suggested an increase of 12 judges 
at the General Court.
11
 The Court’s initiative aimed to address the sharp rise in the number of 
                                                          
9
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cases pending before the General Court. For several years, the number of cases disposed of 
by the General Court was lower than the number of new cases, and so the number of pending 
cases was constantly rising. But under the Court’s proposal, it looked as though some 
countries, but not others, would be able to nominate two judges at the General Court, and this 
prompted, within Council, some discussion of how some judges would be appointed on merit 
rather than purely by nationality. By 2014, Council had been unable to agree on the rotation 
mechanism necessary for the 2011 proposal to be approved. While some Member States 
insisted on having a permanent extra judge, others, such as France for example, were quite 
willing to agree on a rotation of judges between Member States. A document from Council 
noted in 2014 that ‘it was impossible to overcome differences as to the method of 
appointment of additional Judges.’
12
 The President of the Court ultimately acknowledged the 
political impasse and at the request of Council submitted in 2014 the amended proposal that 
the number of judges should be doubled at the General Court – two judges per Member States 
instead of one. Unsurprisingly that proposal was adopted by the European Parliament and 
Council in Regulation 2015/2422.
13
 The number of two judges per Member State will be 
doubled in three stages by 2019, with the parallel abolition of the seven-judge Civil Service 
Tribunal in September 2016.  
 The examination of the (by all accounts) botched process of reform at the General 
Court lies outside the remit of this article. But the pragmatic approach of the Court of Justice 
towards judicial reform leaves the issue of judicial merit untouched. Why can’t Member 
States agree that merit rather than nationality should be the primary criterion? Sir Konrad 
Schieman, a former Member of the Court, spoke frankly about this in 2013:  
 ‘These sensitivities [of the smaller states] are of various kinds. The first is a desire not 
to be overlooked, and not to have one’s potential judges overlooked, just because one is 
small. A second is a desire not to be dominated by the big states who already dominate 
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Council of the European Union, ‘Reform of the General Court of the European Union -Way forward’, Doc. 
16576/14. For a detailed account of the process of reform of the General Court, see F. Dehousse, ‘The Reform 
of the EU Courts (II). Abandoning the Management Approach by Doubling the General Court’, p. 25-26. One 
may object that there was less than one judge per Member State in the EU Civil Service Tribunal. It however 
had a limited scope (European Union civil servants’ employment cases only) with no more than 140 cases a 
year. Importantly, as stated by the President of the Court in 2014, ‘Appointments to the CST have never been 
straightforward’. Member States have had divergent views as to whether the rotation principle should be applied 
and, if so, to what extent. This led to the paralysis of the appointment process at some point, with Member 
States unable to agree within Council to make the appointments which it was required it make. 
13
 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 
amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union [2015] OJ L 341.  
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in various respects. A third is a desire to be seen by national voters to be securing as 
much as possible for one’s own state. A fourth concerns the desire of various 
governments to use European Union posts to reward those whom they wish to reward or 
to park those whom they prefer to see away from home. In some Member States the 
allocation of such posts is traditionally a matter of considerable political haggling – 
your party can nominate a judge in Luxembourg if my party can appoint its nominee to 
the presidency of our top Administrative Court’.
14
 
 Even so, one might think that each Member State could find two judges of sufficient 
quality from each country. But, and this is the more fundamental challenge, Member States 
understand the notion of judicial merit differently from each other. Thus, typically in the 
context of career judiciaries, criteria for judicial selection on merit put the emphasis on legal 
knowledge and technical skills such as competences in judgment-drafting, in the conduct of 
proceedings in open court, or efficiency. But within European civil law-based judicial 
systems themselves there is no single pattern of the judge and there isn’t a one-size-fits-all 
selection and appointment process. In some jurisdictions, politicians will strive to vet 
candidates for the highest courts, where points of constitutional law may be decided; in others 
they will allow that fellow legal professionals will have best idea of the merits of competing 
candidates. Processes and criteria will reflect boundaries between law and politics specific to 
each country, with distinct roles allocated to parliament, judges or the legal doctrine in 
driving legal developments.
15
 
 
B. THE ‘BON JUGE EUROPÉEN’ 
 Even if Member States were to concur on the core requirements of judicial merit, they 
may disagree on what judicial merit means in the context of the Court of Justice – in the same 
way that they have different views about European integration and the Court’s role in that 
respect. The selection criteria for the Court (as a judicial body, in Article 252 TFEU) leave 
accordingly much discretion to Member States in their nominating process.
16
 The definition 
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 Sir Konrad Schiemann, in European Committee Justice, Institutions and Consumer Protection, House of 
Lords, ‘Follow-up Inquiry into the Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Oral and written 
evidence’ (2013), p. 65. 
15
S. Turenne, Fair Reflection of society in judicial systems. A Comparative Study (Springer, 2015), p. 1.  
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 Those criteria are replicated from the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Member States’ 
discretion is no longer absolute: ‘the existence of a national procedure enabling the merits of candidates to be 
assessed in an independent and objective manner may, when in the eyes of the panel a candidature has certain 
weak points, work in the candidate's favour as the panel's doubts and questions can be put aside by the trust it 
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of merit by the current President of the Article 255 TFEU panel (‘the panel’) only emphasises 
‘the aptitude to efficiency and rapidly exercise the judicial function.’
17
 For that purpose, all 
professional paths in the field of law are ‘equally legitimate’ and ‘in particular’ those of 
judge, university professor, lawyer or high-level official specialised in the field of law.’
18
 
Some basic features of the ‘bon juge européen’ are nonetheless gradually emerging through 
the work of the Scrutiny Panel. The panel has, for example, regularly emphasised the ability 
of candidates to be inclusive of legal traditions very unlike his or her own nation’s traditions. 
The panel is expressly looking for the ability to engage with the interactions between the 
European legal order and the national legal systems.  
 Unlike other international courts, the Court deals with constitutional and ordinary 
jurisdictional matters; and the Court’s primary interlocutors are domestic jurisdictions (rather 
than Member States), looking for guidance about the interpretation of European Union law 
through the preliminary ruling procedure (also the main bulk of the Court’s case load). Those 
characterising features would justify, we suggest, a greater emphasis on judicial experience of 
any kind from nominated candidates. The need to make judgments with an eye on their likely 
application in Member States assumes ever greater importance as the Court, as a judicial 
body, intervenes today in sensitive areas with immediate repercussions on an individual’s 
liberty (police and judicial cooperation) or right (child custody, asylum and visas inter alia). 
For the sense of belonging mentioned in the introduction to exist, the Court’s decisions must 
be easily understood and properly translated into the domestic legal systems by domestic 
judges. Some, in our interviews, commented on the importance of nominating individuals 
with some experience of ordinary courts’ litigation, who are not so detached from the real 
difficulties which domestic judges encounter when called upon to implement the Court’s 
preliminary rulings.  
 If there is no appetite for a greater number of appointees with experience of ordinary 
litigation, then one alternative may be to encourage having a greater number of legal 
secretaries who are drawn from domestic judiciaries.
19
 The French legal secretaries, for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
places in the national procedure’, in Third Activity Report of the Panel provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, SN 1118/2014, p. 14.  
17
 J.-M Sauvé, ‘Conference: EU Court: Looking Forward’, p 15. See the panel operating rules, Council 
Decisions of 25 February 2010 (2010/124/EU) and (2010/125/EU). 
18
Third Activity Report of the Panel provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, p. 11. 
19
Michal Bobek develops a similar argument in M. Adams, de Waele and Meeusen (eds.), Judging Europe’s 
Judges. The legitimacy of the case law of the European Court of Justice, p. 233. 
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example, can be, and sometimes are, judges on secondment, and they bring with them their 
knowledge and experience of national judging and national law.  
 Finding specialist judges is another matter of contention in relation to judicial 
selection. For its own domestic purposes, a country will often want to choose judges with 
specialist areas because of particular demand at a particular time, and it can easily do so, if 
necessary by setting up new courts. But setting up specialised chambers at the General Court 
is problematic. For a start, the General Court is defined as a generalist jurisdiction (Article 
254 TFEU; specialised courts can be created under Article 257 TFEU). Still, Regulation 
2015/2422, which implemented doubling the number of judges at the General Court, 
curiously requires that the report on the functioning of the General Court after this judicial 
reform, focuses in particular on ‘the further establishment of specialised chambers and/or 
other structural changes.’
20
 While there may be gains in specialisation, in terms of expertise 
and productivity, there is an obvious risk of fragmentation of the jurisprudence between 
distinct chambers of the General Court. More importantly, if the General Court’s 
specialisation were to happen, it is likely to transfer the issue of the nationality of judges from 
the Council to the General Court, and it is more likely than not to politicise the distribution of 
judicial portfolios:
21
 Member States are likely to either advocate for their candidate to be part 
of a designated specialist chamber or be the specialist judge in a designated area, or they will 
aim for their candidates not to be part of a particular chamber. It is one thing to informally 
and from time to time assign cases judges who has gained expertise in one area, quite another 
step to develop specialised chambers within a generalist jurisdiction. It may not be a surprise, 
then, that the General Court itself has opposed such development.  
 There is a further important difference between the selection of domestic and 
European judges. A country may often wish to include measures towards greater diversity in 
terms of gender or race. But at European level, if a woman judge, or a judge with experience 
in criminal law, were to leave, one could hardly ask the Member State who nominated her to 
send another. At the level of the Court of Justice, diversity is the responsibility of every 
Member State, and consequently, individually that of no one. The European Parliament has 
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Article 3.1, Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Protocol No. 3 on the Statue 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union. One may question the process for considering this important 
issue; on which see, further, F. Dehousse, ‘The Reform of the EU Courts (II). The Brilliant Alternative 
Approach of the European Court of Human Rights’, ibid.  
21
 M. van der Woude, ‘In favour of effective judicial protection: A reminder of the 1988 objectives, 
Concurrences, 4/2014, p. 3, cited by F. Dehousse in ‘The Reform of the EU Courts (II). Abandoning the 
Management Approach by Doubling the General Court’, p. 59. 
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attempted to procure change by introducing the objective of gender diversity in Regulation 
2015/2422. This gender objective is phrased in the following terms 
‘11) It is of high importance to ensure gender balance within the General Court. In 
order to achieve that objective, partial replacements in that Court should be organised 
in such a way that the governments of Member States gradually begin to nominate 
two Judges for the same partial replacement with the aim therefore of choosing one 
woman and one man, provided that the conditions and procedures laid down by the 
Treaties are respected’.  
 It is doubtful whether this provides the Panel with any constraining power in relation 
to gender diversity - especially as the Panel has previously stated that it doesn’t have the 
competence to determine the composition of the Court of Justice or of the General Court. 
There are good reasons behind the Panel’s restrained attitude: there is still a need to 
strengthen judicial selection procedures at State level, some of which can still be seen as 
lacking transparency or guarantees of independence from executive influences. In those 
jurisdictions where the line of demarcation between the political sphere and the judiciary can 
be blurred, the objective of gender diversity cannot detract from the prior issue of applying 
the rule of law without interference: the most important principle governing the functioning 
of the Judiciary remains the principle of separation of powers. It is not a coincidence that the 
same Regulation 2015/2422 re-asserts independence and impartiality as criteria for scrutiny 
by the Panel. 
 The gender objective set under Regulation 2015/2422 however entitles the Panel to 
require statistics about gender diversity at domestic level, and the Member State’s 
explanation about the possible lack of a woman candidate. Above all, these explanations and 
statistics should be made public, in order to foster or continue a domestic debate about gender 
diversity. But it is likely that those explanations will merely re-open discussions about 
judicial merit at the level of the Court, and raise questions about whether national 
benchmarks for merit unfairly favour one group over another.
22
 
 
 
§4. FIXED TENURE, PERIODIC RENEWAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM 
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The main source of Member States’ influence and constraint upon the Court, however, lies in 
the length of judicial tenure (six years) and the possibility of unlimited re-nomination by 
one’s Member State and re-appointment. The possibility of renewing the appointment of a 
sitting judge carries, within any judicial appointment system, the suspicion that this could 
compromise the judges’ actual or perceived independence, by ‘throwing candidates for re-
appointment at the mercy of their national (…) Government during their terms of office.’
23
 
The single-voice judgment style adopted by the Court at least ensures that governments do 
not know the opinions of their national judge, thus reducing the probability that a judge’s 
tenure will not be renewed on accounts of his known judicial contributions. There cannot be 
any temptation to ‘write an opinion to the outside world’ as may be the case at the 
International Court of Justice when seeking the support of states for re-election.
24
Although 
the Court judges are generally renewed in their seat, the subject of their renewal seems today 
to be the ‘unfinished, and almost unstarted, business’ that judicial selection was once 
perceived to be, before the Lisbon Treaty introduced a scrutiny panel for judicial selection 
under Article 255 TFEU.
25
 The possibility of renewal is a matter of discretion left to the 
relevant Member State and it seems that a Member State’s pending decision on renewal will 
not be openly discussed at the Court. Equally problematic with any limited term of judicial 
office in any court, is the potential dependence, from the sitting judge, on his or her state for a 
post-bench career, especially when young judges are appointed.
26
 
 Some may still argue that the Member States’ power to nominate their current judge 
for another term of office ensures some checks upon judges too. While judicial accountability 
is required as a matter of principle, it is difficult to think of the Member States’ discretionary 
power of renewal as a legitimate or appropriate means of accountability in the context of the 
Court. In any event, as noted above, the existence of a collegiate judgment prevents the 
Member State to know the contribution of its judge in the conduct of the judicial business. It 
could then be objected that, in such case judges have nothing to fear from the national 
renewal process. However, there is a lack, in many Member States, of a transparent process 
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 P. Mahoney, cited by Lord Mance, ‘The Composition of the European Court of Justice. The text of a talk 
given to the United Kingdom Association for European Law’ (19 October 2011), p. 10.  
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 R. Mackenzie et al., Selecting International judges; principle, Process and Politics (Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 210. 
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 Lord Mance, ‘The Common Law and Europe: Differences of Style Or Substance and Do They Matter? The 
Holdsworth Address 2007’, The Holdsworth Club of the University of Birmingham, p. 10.  
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 But see Article 9, Code of Conduct for Members and former Members of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, Official Journal of the European Union [2016] OJC 483/01.  
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and criteria for renewal at the Court; non-renewal may also happen for reasons which have 
little to do with the professional merit of the judge, and more to do with some internal 
‘political haggling’, as suggested above (Section 3.A) by Sir Konrad Schieman. Judicial 
accountability isn’t the issue here.  
 The full impact of the relatively short period of service at the Court appears as soon as 
one mentions the permanent triennial renewal at the Court of Justice, which concerns one half 
of the number of the judges.
27
Adding to this, it follows from some early departures that some 
judges will be appointed outside the normal triennial renewal procured. Franklin Dehousse 
suggested that the transfer of a judge from the General Court to the Court of Justice 
represented a damaging movement, because that judge will generally leave with his/her 
whole team of legal secretaries: ‘So, permanently, new people enter and begin to build a 
basic knowledge while others leave with their built knowledge to use it elsewhere.’
28
For 
budgetary purposes, the Court estimates the probability of Members leaving office or having 
their term of office renewed and, interestingly, but for budgetary purposes only, it seems to 
assume that only half of the Members whose term of office comes to expire will be 
renewed.
29
 Thus, in October 2015, the terms of office of 18 judges at the Court expired and 
the Court Budget assumed that nine of those would leave office or would not see their office 
renewed ‘with the addition, for the sake of prudence, of four, not anticipated, departures (two 
at the Court and two at the General Court, based on the average in past years).’
30
 
 Those current rules cause great problems to the Court, not least in terms of how they 
manage their case-load. Advocate General Sharpston stated in 2011 that ‘in order to ensure 
that judicial business is handled without interruption, it is important to know who is being 
renewed and who is likely to be replaced’, but, ‘Member States do not always communicate 
this information to the Court until rather late in the day.’
31
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 As in many European countries too, there is a principle of continuity, i.e., that the 
same judge should stay with the case.
32
 Balancing the case load takes the form of allocating 
cases to the judge available rather than weighting the case as can be done in some countries.
33
 
It seems difficult to fairly spread the weight of the caseload between judges if one does not 
know who stays at the Court, who is about to leave and who, or how experienced, the 
newcomer will be. It also seems difficult to make good use of the experience accumulated by 
judges. In that respect, the instability at the General Court has been repeatedly emphasised. 
An often-cited illustration of the regular transfer of heavy cases between cabinets and the 
reopening of those cases is the case of ICI v European Commission in which the appeal was 
lodged on 20 March 2001 and judgment was handed down on 25 June 2010.
34
 It was 
reallocated two times between judges and three times between chambers. Not only does 
uncertainty affect the individual judge, it also has a direct effect on those cases assigned to 
the other members of the Chamber of which those judges are members.
35
 
 One may doubt that doubling the number of judges at the General Court, as decided 
under Regulation 2015/2422,
36
 will fully solve this issue. The root of the instability is the 
inability of Member States to consider the extension of the term of judicial office (for 
example from six to nine years or 12 years) and the concomitant conditions that the 
appointment be non-renewable, with no requirement to renew half of the Court membership 
every three years. A single, non-renewable term would lift the perceived threat to the 
individual judge’s independence noted above. It would unlock the potential of, or remove 
some of the objections to other proposed reforms. For example, a more expansive judicial 
discourse may become possible, including anonymous dissenting opinions (as is possible in 
the WTO appellate body).
37
 The issue of specialised Chambers or judges might then become 
less politically-charged (see above, Section 3.B). 
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 Further, the extension of the judges’ term of office to (e.g.) nine years, without a 
three-year interval to appoint part of the Court would establish stability within the Court. This 
is what happened at the European Court of Human Rights when, precisely in order to 
maintain continuity and reinforce that Court’s independence and impartiality,
38
 a single, non-
renewable term of office (nine years) was introduced in 2010, in combination with the 
abolition of the system whereby large groups of judges were renewed at three-year intervals. 
Similar reforms at the Court would radically alter and, we suggest, clarify the sense of 
belonging of the Court to the benefit of the European polis, beyond the national governments’ 
stronghold. 
 This would naturally trigger new issues of judicial accountability. While this topic is 
outside the remit of this piece, we note the proposal to make the Court accountable to 
domestic judges by involving the latter in matters of judicial governance of the Court, for 
example in the form of some High Council of the European Judiciary which would, inter alia, 
give opinions on the suitability of the judges proposed by Member States and approve the 
rules of procedures of the two jurisdictions.
39
 
 In the absence of a longer but single and non-renewable term of office, judges are ‘the 
least stable component of the whole system’ compared with legal secretaries and the 
registry.
40
If, as has been said, the Treaty revision that is required for judicial reform is truly 
impossible, a working agreement remains possible, to the extent that Member States should 
begin any selection process with a perspective of two terms of office instead of one. At the 
very least, agreement from the Member States should be sought to allow the judges who are 
not renewed or retire to continue with their assigned cases, perhaps for fixed period of time, 
as happens in some international courts.
41
 This would provide what the Court has been 
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looking for: an even firmer basis for the independence of the Court’s members; it would also 
strengthen the continuity of its case-law.
42
 
 
 So the influence of Member States in appointments, including the renewal of those, is 
substantial. They have differing conceptions of judicial merit, and have little incentive to 
think about the impact of their preferred candidate on the Court as a whole, e.g. in terms of 
expertise. There is not even a guarantee that their preferred candidates will be fluent in 
English or French (a matter of ongoing discussion). One may infer as consequences a number 
of judgments which have been so intensely negotiated that they are difficult to decipher and 
for domestic judges to follow.  
 
§5. THE PRACTICE OF COLLEGIALITY 
We have so far considered the pressures on the Court. Judges bring different understandings 
of merit and of their role at the Court, and they all too often have too little time to settle down 
at the Court and discover their own voice. But the Court does what it can to ensure that 
judges are equally assimilated in the workings of the court and this is achieved with the 
constitutive value of collegiality. Collegiality acts as well as a positive mechanism to enhance 
judicial impartiality. 
 
A. THE GENERAL MEETING OF THE COURT 
The best illustration of collegiality at work is the weekly general meeting of the Court of 
Justice (as a judicial body). After the parties make their written submissions to the Court, the 
Judge-Rapporteur will prepare a preliminary report on the cases that need to be determined 
and present it to the General Meeting of the Court, which comprises all members of the Court 
including the Advocates General. The Judge-Rapporteur will propose the formation to which 
the case should be assigned and the Court in its general meeting will decide, after hearing the 
designated Advocate General, the assignment of the case.
43
 While not all members of the 
Court may have time to read the documents available for the meeting, this general meeting 
allows for greater cohesion in the practice of assignment, as well as building the collective 
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identity of the Court. It is one way in which members relate to each other and achieve a sense 
of collective independence. 
 These meetings may also assist in anticipating allegations of bias. Proceedings in 
which a Member State is a party traditionally constitute a small percentage of the overall 
caseload of the Court Justice.
44
 The Court’s decision is likely to affect the interests of all 
Member States, including those who are not parties to the dispute. Conversely, the ever-
expanding competences of the Court make it difficult to determine in which cases the 
national interests of a specific State are affected to the extent that national representation 
within the Court would be required. Whether or not that would have been the explanation 
adopted at the time, the Statute of the Court that was redrafted in 1979 leaves aside the 
principle of the national judge in deliberations.
45
 It does however preserve the right for a 
Member State party to the proceedings to demand that any case shall be heard before a Grand 
Chamber. A former judge, Konrad Schieman commented in 2013:  
…‘for the purpose of doing their job well in the General Court it does not seem to me 
that the national origins of the judges of that court are of importance. There is 
occasionally something to be said for having a judge of a Member State to hand who 
can explain something which puzzles an outsider but this is infrequent’.  
 There is good reason to acknowledge the presence of the national judge within the 
Court. Judges may need awareness of the national context to an issue. Some issues arise 
which are closely connected with the domestic legal order of one of the parties concerned. 
Having a national judge also sustains confidence in the judicial system, which is essential 
in some cases when a Member State loses. At the same time, it might be said that this does 
not create an obvious danger that Member States might appoint their judge in the hope that 
he or she might give amenable judgments involving their country. The judges’ individual 
contributions towards the judgment will not be known and as David Edward wrote, in 
deliberations, ‘the role of the judge of the country from which the case comes is not to urge 
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on the Court a solution favourable to that Member State. Such advocacy would almost 
certainly be counterproductive.’
46
 
 The move away from national interests has now been endorsed as a matter of 
principle in the 2017 Code of Conduct for Member and Former Members of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, which requires members of the Court to perform their 
duties ‘with complete independence and integrity, without taking account of any personal 
or national interest’ (our emphasis).
47
 The Code also contains a statement about the main 
threat, in practice, to the Court’s independence: ‘[members of the Court] shall neither seek 
nor follow any instructions from the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union, 
the governments of the Member States or any private or public entities’.
48
 
 The Court of Justice further held, in the case of Chronopost, that the right to a fair 
trial means that ‘every court is obliged to check whether, in its composition, it constitutes 
such an independent and impartial tribunal, where this is disputed on a ground that does not 
immediately appear to be manifestly devoid of merit.’
49
 This check is an essential procedural 
requirement, so that that the Court of Justice is required, of its own motion and as a ‘matter of 
public policy’, to check the regularity of the composition of the Court which delivered the 
judgment under appeal.
50
 Clearly the General Meetings under the umbrella of collegiality 
have an important role here.  
 
B. ENHANCING INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 
Collegiality is a fundamental principle of court organisation. In a narrow sense, it is about 
taking a vote of the majority to decide a case, as both the General Court and the Court do in 
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the absence of consensus. The Court itself construes the principle of collegiality in decision-
making in broader terms – albeit here in a case involving the Commission:  
 ‘The functioning of the Commission is governed by the principle of collegiality. That 
principle is based on the equal participation of the Commissioners in the adoption of 
decisions, from which it follows in particular that decisions should be the subject of 
collective deliberation and that all the members of the college of Commissioners 
should bear collective responsibility at political level for all decisions adopted’. (our 
emphasis) 
Collegiality can thus be defined as the interaction between equals in decision 
making, in the pursuit of the greater good. We suggest that the practice of collegiality has 
developed within the Court to reflect some (four) distinct values. First, it ensures judicial 
independence from the appointing body. Thus the Court is collegiate ‘in that it operates 
as a relatively detached, if not cloistered institution’.
51
 There is no separate, concurring or 
dissenting, opinion at the Court. The main and good reason for the collegiate judgment 
remains the need to protect the independence of the judge from his or her appointing 
Member State.
52
 This does not entirely address the problem of renewable tenures, but at 
least it counters one of its most unwelcome possibilities. 
 Second, collegiality refers to the interactions between judges within the deliberation. 
Von Bogdandy interprets collegiality as ‘reciprocal controls’ upon judges,
53
 but ‘reciprocal 
controls’ are only one part of the function of collegiality, which also brings persuasion into 
the decision making process (although in practice judicial positions may not shift 
significantly).
54
 This is because, contrary to some national jurisdictions where seniority 
within the Court matters in deliberations, a principle of equality applies between judges at the 
Court of justice and at the General Court.  
 Third, collegiality is about taking collective responsibility for the judgment, with 
numerous drafts before the final decision is reached: ‘all members of the Court are 
responsible, up to the last minute, for making the judgment as good as it can be even if they 
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disagree with the result.’
55
 This also confirms that, whilst legal coherence and legal 
consistency are regulative ideals in any judicial decision making, legal argumentation is 
equally a conversation between Court members, testing, disagreeing and refining a legal 
argument.  
 The French judge Garapon said that ‘to grasp a culture thus involves one in trying to 
formulate what is so obvious for the members that ‘it goes without saying’. Our interpretation 
of collegiality goes against the view commonly heard but not evidenced, that too many 
judges are ‘captured’ by their legal secretaries because - for example - the judges do not 
fluently speak the working language of the Court (French) and therefore they give too much 
discretion to their legal secretaries in drafting the judgment.  While it is difficult to establish 
evidence of our understanding of collegiality, we expect our interpretation to operate to some 
substantial degree. Thus, at the end of a lengthy discussion with a member of the Court about 
various rules of procedures, that member added, jokingly: “and the worst is the principle of 
collegiality”, in the sense that you must listen to your colleagues’ arguments and seek 
consensus or a compromise even though you may be deeply convinced that your own way of 
thinking should prevail. Collegiality will be chilled by a lack of responsiveness to the 
opinions of your colleagues.  
 Fourth, collegiality also supports unity in diversity. When it comes to textual 
interpretation, collegiality implies extracting an autonomous European meaning out of a 
commonly used legal term among various Member States. This requires a certain detachment 
from one particular legal culture within the deliberation as much as the ability to 
acknowledge the diversity of legal solutions to a particular problem – a diversity that greatly 
increased following with the successive enlargements of the Union. National references are 
only accepted when absolutely needed, that is, when it happens that a legal question is settled 
by the case law or a particular statute in one’s own country and it isn’t settled in EU law. In 
that case, then references to the reasons for a particular solution available in a specific 
Member State would be considered. This then explains that the Court’s judgments avoid 
openly linking a particular interpretation of the law to a particular legal system. Koen 
Lenaerts similarly cites collegiality as a fundamental constraint upon the Court’s form of 
judicial reasoning.
56
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Some have argued that governments could seek to appoint judges who share their 
ideological orientation, and that the collegiate structure encourages the Court to make 
‘“majoritarian” rulings— i.e., rulings that reflect the views of judges appointed by a majority 
of Member State governments’.
 57
 Our contention, however, is that collegiality will moderate 
individual ideological or policy preferences. Collegiality is a matter of rational choice, as 
judges are ‘locked into intricate webs of interdependence where the impulse to speak in a 
personal voice must always be balanced against the need to act collectively in order to be 
effective’.
 58
 
 This is not to decry the criticisms of the well-known brevity of the Court’s judgments. 
There may be greater need for expert discussion of the implications of some cases, and some 
cases may not greatly assist domestic judges in their resolution of a dispute. Our argument 
has instead been that the principle of collegiality does, and should, apply as a necessary 
corollary of judicial independence and judicial impartiality.  
 
§6. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has demonstrated how the judicial selection, appointment and renewal processes 
deeply constrain and influence decision making processes at the Court of Justice. It is often 
said that the creation of the Court was only hesitantly accepted,
59
 but this falls short of a 
justification for the damaging impact caused by a short tenure period combined with the 
permanent triennial renewal of sitting judges at the Court of Justice. We have argued, first, 
that those institutional constraints constitute a fundamental source of instability at the Court 
of Justice and, second, that the discretion left to Member States for renewal is a concern for 
judicial independence. Some may suggest that the instability is more pronounced at the 
General Court than at the Court and that in practice, in many cases, judges and advocate 
generals are re-appointed. This would however miss the point that the Court as a whole needs 
long-term stability to function properly and with convincing authority. Further, the ‘overall’ 
benevolent use, in practice, of the Member States’ discretionary power to renew an 
appointment at the Court of Justice doesn’t, in itself, guarantee an independent process of 
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renewal. In answer to those issues, Treaty revision towards one single judicial mandate would 
be our preferred remedy but it is unlikely to happen. So our first recommendation, 
considering the need for stability and greater independence, has been that Member States 
should expressly begin any appointment process in the General Court with a perspective of 
two terms of office mandates.   
More broadly, this article has examined the current stronghold of Member States on 
the judicial selection process. Unlike other international courts, the Court’s primary 
interlocutors are domestic jurisdictions, and we have suggested a greater emphasis on judicial 
experience of any kind from nominated candidates, or that domestic judges be encouraged to 
act as legal secretaries, in order to address the concern that the Court’s rulings must hit the 
ground running. If this is not possible then agreement from Member States should be sought 
to allow the judges who are not renewed, or who retire, to continue with their assigned cases, 
perhaps for fixed period of time, as happens in some international courts.  
Above all, greater scrutiny of the Member States’ traditions and expectations in 
relation to judicial appointments can only help towards what might be, in a long term 
perspective, a truly integrated European judiciary. Thus the Panel can and should ask 
Member States who repeatedly nominate male judges about judicial diversity statistics and 
any practices that may be under way to improve the ratios of women and under-represented 
groups.  
Against all institutional constraints considered in this article, the principle of 
collegiality can be seen as an internal reaction within the Court to ensure independence in 
case allocation, impartiality in difficult cases, and as a means towards a jurisprudence that is 
not too closely based on the legal culture or traditions of any particular Member State. But 
this latter concern does mean that some judgments may appear to be compromises, and more 
radical reform will be needed for those who hanker after clearer and bolder decisions. The 
proposals outlined in that article, taken together, would likely cause a culture change at the 
Court. Collegiality should still apply, but the style of judgments may themselves start to 
become more open and increase the reach of those judgements within domestic jurisdictions. 
More ambitious judicial reforms can only succeed with in mind a single, non-renewable term 
of office, without any triennial renewal of the Court membership. Only then we can hope for 
an unequivocal answer to our initial interrogation about the Court’s belonging.   
 
